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Evidence that demands a verdict?1
David Weber2
Source—Meaning—Receptor (SMR) theories of translation, such as “dynamic equivalence” and
“meaning-based” theories, shifted focus from the equivalence of FORM to the equivalence of
MEANING. SMR theories were a significant advance and have been the basis for many modern
English translations.
However, SMR theories were formulated when the dominant theory of communication was the
code model. Consequently they presumed that meaning was determined almost entirely by a
text (utterance) itself. This theory is now rejected in favor of theories that understand interpre-
tation as the inferential product of the interaction of the text with (mind-mediated) context.
These newer theories shift the focus from meaning, largely a semantic notion, to the prag-
matic/rhetorical dimensions of the text.
It is thus natural to wonder if there is evidence that a SMR approach to translation leads to
pragmatic/rhetorical oversights that have negative effects on translations. Here I will propose
some candidates, drawing them from various modern English translations.
Introduction
The translation of ancient and authoritative documents is exceedingly difficult. Those who bless
us with modern translations of Scripture deserve our respect and gratitude. I am grateful for each
of the translations mentioned below. Each reflects a delicate balancing of criteria designed to meet
the needs of a particular readership in a particular way. My remarks should in no way lead anyone
to appreciate any of these translations the less.
In the last fifty years much thinking about language has been dominated by the CODE MODEL
of communication, which assumes that meanings are transmitted from speaker (author) to hearer
(reader) across a channel much like information can be transmitted across a wire by electric im-
pulses. The speaker encodes the meaning to be communicated into a linguistic form (sound, writ-
ing, sign) using a lexicon and grammar. The form is transmitted over some channel (speech, writ-
ing,. . . ) to the hearer, who decodes the meaning using the same (or very similar) lexicon and gram-
mar:
MEANINGS— encode →FORM— decode →MEANINGR
where the subscripted S refers to the source or speaker and R refer to the receptor or hearer.
The code model is simple and intuitively appealing, but its influence on serious thought about
language owes much to Claude Shannon’s 1948 paper that laid the mathematical foundations of in-
formation transmission [16]. The code model was seen to be subsumed by Shannon’s transmission
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model, thus inheriting respectibility from the scientific basis Shannon had provided for information
transmission.
Early in this period there was considerable optimism about machine translation. It was
thought that linguistics—a rapidly developing discipline—would provide the enabling technol-
ogy: a proper understanding of syntax and semantics. Armed with proper grammars and lexicons
of the source and target languages, it should be possible to decode meanings from a source lan-
guage text and then encode those meanings into a target language text. Why, the process is so
mechanical—it was thought—that it should be possible to make a machine do it!
It was during this period that Source—Meaning—Receptor (SMR) theories of translation were
developed. The first was the flagship theory of Nida [12]. From this grew two traditions: the func-
tional (or “dynamic”) equivalence theory of Nida and Taber [13] and de Waard and Nida [3], and
the meaning-based theories of Beekman and Callow [1] and Larson [8]. These theories shifted focus
from the equivalence of the FORM of source and target texts, to the equivalence of their MEANINGS.
This represented significant progress. However, these theories were based solidly on the code
model and thus inherited some of its liabilities: a preoccupation with text, the notion that texts
contain meanings, a rather mechanical image of how texts communicate meanings based on the
notions of encoding and decoding, and so forth. And while virtually all who helped shape SMR
theories recognized the necessity of considering contextual and pragmatic factors, these remained
largely at the peripheries of the theories. They exerted pressure on both the theory and the practice
of translation, but never penetrated to the point that context-driven inference was incorporated at
the very core of interpretation.
By contrast, current theories (e.g., Relevance Theory [17]) regard the interpretation of an utter-
ance to be the inferential product of the interaction of a text with its (mind-mediated) context. This
shifts the focus from “meaning” as a semantic notion to a broader pragmatic and rhetorical one;
this should become clear from the examples considered below.
Given the intellectual roots of SMR theories of translation, it is natural to wonder if there is evi-
dence that they lead to pragmatic or rhetorical oversights, with negative effects on translations. In
this paper I will propose some cases of this, drawing them from various modern English transla-
tions. Some of these reflect—in my opinion—wrong exegesis (perhaps a consequence of exegetical
practice not based on a proper theory of communication). Others are poor translations, reflecting a
failure to appreciate the rhetorical impact that the translation should achieve.
So I wish to show that the legacy of the code model can still be seen in recent SMR-influenced
translations. But it is no easy task to make a good case, for to do so requires meeting various
challenges:
1. It must be shown that the passage being considered followed a code model concept or SMR
translation principle. Even if the translation contains a statement of the translation principles
employed, it remains to be shown, for the case in point, that some particular code model
concept or SMR translation principle was responsible for the rendering being challenged.
And this can only be surmised, since translators’ thoughts are not subject to direct inspection.
2. For each case it must be demonstrated that a rhetorically-informed exegesis and/or transla-
tion is better than the one being challenged. This is a daunting task because the interpretations
reflected in modern translations are usually based on considerable scholarship, perhaps even
a consensus of scholarly opinion.
In the cases I propose below, I will not argue from details of the source language, but give
what I take to be a fairly transparent interpretation based on how the text makes its point, as
enlightened by insights from Relevance Theory (along the lines followed in Weber [18]).
3. “Meaning” was used liberally throughout the literature on SMR translation theories, but gen-
erally without definition. So what is the meaning of “meaning”? When those who shaped
SMR theories spoke of meaning, what should we understand?
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For example, what is the meaning of Do not cook a kid in its mother’s milk? It obviously means
what it says: it is a prohibition against cooking a kid (goat) in its mother’s milk. This is the
meaning that results from the application of grammar and lexicon. It is a notion of meaning
focussed very squarely on semantics.
However, Do not cook a kid in its mother’s milk has a deeper meaning that results from sub-
mitting its semantic meaning to context-driven inferences, along the lines of “Do not practice
magic.”3 In some sense this is the real meaning, going far beyond the matter of how one
should or should not cook a kid.
Under the influence of the code model, SMR theories of translation generally employed
“meaning” in the former, semantics-focused sense, whereas current translation theories, ben-
efitting from cognitive theories of communication and rich theories of pragmatics, use “mean-
ing” in the broader sense that encompasses both semantics and pragmatics.
The translations from which I draw examples are:
CEV The Contemporary English Version [2] is intended as “biblically accurate, reader friendly,
and understandable—even for first-time Bible readers.”
NIV The New International Version [6] is intended as “a thought-for-thought translation in con-
temporary English for private and public use.”
NLT The New Living Translation [7] is intended as “exegetically accurate and idiomatically pow-
erful.”
I begin each discussion by giving the text as rendered in the NASB [10], a translation that “attempts
to bring the contemporary reader as close as possible to the actual wording and grammatical struc-
ture of the original writers.” I sometimes highlight phrases about which I comment.
Section 1 considers two cases of echoic utterance. Section 1.1 considers a passage for which one
translation suppresses clues for understanding the situation, thus leading the reader to a “literal”
interpretation very different from what I believe was intended. Section 1.2 considers a case of irony
or sarcasm4 which, if not taken into account, can cause serious distortion.
Section 2 deals with some subtle but significant issues of referring expressions. 2.1 considers a
case where denotational equivalence leads to translations with connotative infelicities. 2.2 consid-
ers a phrase which is commonly translated in a way that fails to activate the main premise of the
argument that follows.
Section 3 considers the rhetorical significance of an instance of repetition and how this case is
rendered in various translations.
1 Echoic utterance
Rhetorical antennae remain sorely singed.
An ECHOIC utterance gives voice to a thought expressed or attributed to someone other than
the speaker, or a thought which the speaker previously expressed or held. For example, suppose
that I bought a car advertised to be highly reliable and, after having driven just a few miles, it broke
down. If I were to say “This car is very reliable,” I would be echoing the thought expressed in the
advertising, NOT a thought that I held. And if you had convinced me to buy this car on the basis
3Or more specifically, “Do not attempt to manipulate the weather by practicing magic, as the
pagans around you do.”
4Relevance Theory [17] analyzes irony as a type of echoic utterance, and sarcasm as a strong form
of irony.
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that it was very reliable, and I say this to you, you would understand my utterance as echoing your
words, triggering inferences about my opinion of your advice and perhaps even about you!
We now discuss two cases of echoic utterance that some translations fail to recognize. (The first
was discussed in Weber [18].)
1.1 Matthew 15.21–28
Consider the NASB rendering of Matthew 15.21–28:
21Jesus went away from there, and withdrew into the district of Tyre and Sidon. 22And a
Canaanite woman from that region came out [exelthousa] and began to cry out [ekrazen], saying,
“Have mercy on me, Lord, Son of David; my daughter is cruelly demon-possessed.” 23But He
did not answer her a word. And His disciples came [proselthontes] and implored Him, saying,
“Send her away, because she keeps shouting at us.” 24But He answered and said, “I was sent
only to the lost sheep of the house of Israel.” 25But she came [elthousa] and began to bow down
before Him, saying, “Lord, help me!” 26And He answered and said, “It is not good to take the
children’s bread and throw it to the dogs.” 27But she said, “Yes, Lord; but even the dogs feed on
the crumbs which fall from their masters’ table.” 28Then Jesus said to her, “O woman, your faith
is great; it shall be done for you as you wish.” And her daughter was healed at once.
I claim (following Weber [18]) that Jesus spoke echoicly in verses 24 and 26. In 24 “I was sent
only to the lost sheep of the house of Israel” echoes a thought the disciples were using to justify
dismissing the woman. In 26, “It is not good to take the children’s bread and throw it to the dogs”
echoes the racist sentiments of others around Jesus (perhaps including those who had come from
Jerusalem mentioned in Mt. 15.1, who may have accompanied Jesus to the region of Tyre and
Sidon).
This interpretation rests on understanding that the Canaanite woman was initially kept at a
distance from Jesus by the disciples. Evidence for this is that she had to SHOUT in her attempt
to make Jesus hear (v. 22), the disciples had to COME to Jesus to speak to him (v. 23), and only
subsequently was the woman able to COME to Jesus (v. 25). Each of these is an important clue to
the situation, and hence the context that must be brought to bear on interpreting Jesus’ words.
Significantly, when verses 24 and 26 are interpreted as being echoic, this passage is understood
as a strong statement against racism. It is a rejection of Jewish exclusivism. As such, it follows
naturally the discussion in verses 1–20 in which Jesus rejected a tradition linking hand washing
and clean-versus-unclean. In 21–28 he rejected the tradition that linked race to an extension of this
distinction to the domain of people: (Jewish = clean; non Jewish = unclean).
Now consider how this passage is rendered in the NLT:
21Jesus then left Galilee and went north to the region of Tyre and Sidon. 22A Gentile
woman who lived there came to him, pleading, “Have mercy on me, O Lord, Son of
David! For my daughter has a demon in her, and it is severely tormenting her.”
23But Jesus gave her no reply—not even a word. Then his disciples urged him to
send her away. “Tell her to leave,” they said. “She is bothering us with all her begging.”
24Then he said to the woman, “I was sent only to help the people of Israel—God’s
lost sheep—not the Gentiles.”
25But she came and worshiped him and pleaded again, “Lord, help me!”
26“It isn’t right to take food from the children and throw it to the dogs,” he said.
27“Yes, Lord,” she replied, “but even dogs are permitted to eat crumbs that fall be-
neath their master’s table.”
28“Woman,” Jesus said to her, “your faith is great. Your request is granted.” And
her daughter was instantly healed.
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The NLT eliminates two of the three clues mentioned above. In verse 22 “pleading” is used instead
of “cry out,” removing the suggestion of distance. In verse 23 there is no indication that the dis-
ciples “came” to Jesus.5 The reader is thus deprived of two clues to understand that, when Jesus
said “I was sent only to the lost sheep of the house of Israel,” he was echoing to the disciples their
mistaken justification for dismissing the woman, and that, upon understanding this, they returned
to the woman and allowed her to approach Jesus. And the rendering of verse 24 further undercuts
this interpretation in two ways: (1) it explicitly states that Jesus said this to the woman and (2)
it fails to reflect the adversative (de), which I take to contrast Jesus’ response with the disciples’
expectation that Jesus would agree to dismiss the woman. (And “But” at the outset of verse 25
(rendering de) then contraposes the woman’s persistence to Jesus’ rejection, rather contraposing
her ultimate good fortune with the initial negative expectations raised by the disciples’ attitude
and conduct.)
The result is that the NLT has reshaped this passage, making it simply about the woman’s faith,
treating the rejection of Jewish exclusivism as at best a very minor issue.
1.2 1 Corinthians 11.19
Consider the NASB rendering of 1 Cor 11.19–22:
17But in giving this instruction, I do not praise you, because you come together not for the
better but for the worse. 18For, in the first place, when you come together as a church, I hear that
divisions exist among you; and in part I believe it. 19For there must also be factions among you,
so that those who are approved may become evident among you. 20Therefore when you meet
together, it is not to eat the Lord’s Supper, 21for in your eating each one takes his own supper
first; and one is hungry and another is drunk. 22What! Do you not have houses in which to eat
and drink? Or do you despise the church of God and shame those who have nothing? What shall
I say to you? Shall I praise you? In this I will not praise you.
Verse 19 should be understood as highly ironic or sarcastic.6 The reasons for this are as follows:
1. 1 Corinthians was written in part to counter disunity, a theme announced in the first chapter:
“10Now I exhort you, brethren, by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that you all agree and
that there be no divisions among you, but that you be made complete in the same mind and
in the same judgment. 11For I have been informed concerning you, my brethren, by Chloe’s
people, that there are quarrels among you.. . . ”
2. Verse 19 is in the middle of a stern scolding regarding division, beginning with “I do not
praise you” (v. 17) and ending with “What shall I say to you? Shall I praise you? In this I
will not praise you” (v. 22). This is hardly the place for a reflective comment on the virtues of
division!
3. In no other place does Paul write anything consistent with a literal interpretation of verse 19,
that is, advocating division.
Sperber and Wilson [17] take irony (including its strong form, sarcasm) to be echoic utterance.
Applied to verse 19, we may suppose that Paul was echoing to the church a twisted justification
that was being used to justify division, either something that had been expressed or something that
Paul had reason to believe some Corinthians were thinking.
The CEV does not interpret verse 19 as ironic, translating it as follows:
5Strangely, verse 25 says “she came and worshipped him” even though verse 22, by saying that
the woman “came to him,” has already located the woman at Jesus.
6I am grateful to Bruce Hollenbach for pointing this case out to me.
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19You are bound to argue with each other, but it is easy to see which of you have
God’s approval.
But is Paul really saying that disagreement is inevitable and that “God-approved” is so obvious?
The NIV rendering could be interpreted as ironic:
19No doubt there have to be differences among you to show which of you have
God’s approval.
“No doubt” may nudge some readers toward an ironic interpretation but it can just as well be taken
literally. Indeed, the NIV Study Bible [14] adds a footnote that reads, “As deplorable as factions may
be, they serve one good purpose: They distinguish those who are faithful and true in God’s sight.”
By contrast, the NLT rendering, by the addition of the exaggerated “of course” and the excla-
mation mark, does an admirable job of inviting an ironic interpretation:
19But, of course, there must be divisions among you so that those of you who are
right will be recognized!
1.3 The exegetical bias toward literal interpretations
Why have exegetes and translators understood John 4.24,26 and 1 Corinthians 11.19 literally? The
answer, I believe, lies with the code model and the view of pragmatics that grew out of it. The code
model viewed texts as CONTAINING meanings encoded and decoded by means of grammatical
and lexical information. As such, it fostered a bias toward literal interpretation and to the view
that non-literal interpretations were deviations from the literal norm. This bias is discussed—and
rejected—by Gibbs [5, p. 398]:
“. . . According to this traditional view, which I have dubbed the STANDARD PRAGMATIC
MODEL (Gibbs, 1994), understanding what any nonliteral utterance means requires that listeners
analyze a sentence’s literal meaning before other figurative meanings can be derived. Another
implication of this model is that understanding tropes requires that a defective literal meaning be
found before the search for a nonliteral meaning can begin. Figurative meaning can be ignored
if the literal meaning of an utterance makes sense in context. Finally, additional inferential work
must be done to derive figurative meanings that are contextually appropriate.
The results of many psycholinguistic experiments have shown these claims to be false (see
Gibbs, 1994, for a review). Listeners and readers can often understand the figurative interpreta-
tions of
metaphor (e.g., Billboards are warts on the landscape);
metonymy (e.g., The ham sandwich left without paying);
sarcasm (e.g., You are a fine friend);
idioms (e.g., John popped the question to Mary);
proverbs (e.g., The early bird catches the worm); and
indirect speech acts (e.g., Would you mind lending me five dollars?)
without having to first analyze and reject their literal meanings when these tropes are seen in
realistic social contexts. These studies specifically demonstrate that people can read figurative
utterances as quickly as—sometimes more quickly than—they can read literal uses of the same
expressions in different contexts or equivalent non-figurative expressions. Research also shows
that people quickly apprehend the nonliteral meaning of simple comparison statements (e.g.,
Surgeons are butchers) even when the literal meaning of these statements fits perfectly with the
context (Glucksberg, Gildea and Bookin, 1982; Shinjo and Myers, 1989). Even without a defec-
tive literal meaning to trigger a search for an alternative figurative meaning, metaphor, to take
one example, can be automatically interpreted. Moreover, experimental studies demonstrate that
understanding metaphor, metonymy, irony, and indirect speech acts requires the same kind of
contextual information as do comparable literal expressions (Gibbs, 1986b; 1986c; Gildea and
Glucksberg, 1983; Keysar, 1989). These observations and experimental findings demonstrate that
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the standard pragmatic view of nonliteral language use has little psychological validity, at least
insofar as very early cognitive processes are concerned (see also Recanati, 1995).”
In light of Gibbs’ claim and the considerable research on which it is based, it is high time that
exegesis shed its bias toward literal interpretations.
2 Referring expressions
Identities may overwhelm arguments.
We will consider two cases in which referring expressions are translated in a way that undercuts
the message of the text.
2.1 Jeremiah 7.1–15
Consider the NASB rendering of Jeremiah 7.1–15:7
1The word that came to Jeremiah from the LORD, saying, 2“Stand in the gate of the LORD’S
house and proclaim there this word and say, ’Hear the word of the LORD, all you of Judah, who
enter by these gates to worship the LORD!”’ 3Thus says the LORD of hosts, the God of Israel,
“Amend your ways and your deeds, and I will let you dwell in this place. 4“Do not trust in
deceptive words, saying, ’This is the temple of the LORD, the temple of the LORD, the temple
of the LORD.’ 5“For if you truly amend your ways and your deeds, if you truly practice justice
between a man and his neighbor, 6if you do not oppress the alien, the orphan, or the widow, and
do not shed innocent blood in this place, nor walk after other gods to your own ruin, 7then I will
let you dwell in this place, in the land that I gave to your fathers forever and ever. 8“Behold,
you are trusting in deceptive words to no avail. 9“Will you steal, murder, and commit adultery
and swear falsely, and offer sacrifices to Baal and walk after other gods that you have not known,
10then come and stand before Me in this house, which is called by My name, and say, ’We are
delivered!’–that you may do all these abominations? 11“Has this house, which is called by My
name, become a den of robbers in your sight? Behold, I, even I, have seen it,” declares the LORD.
12“But go now to My place which was in Shiloh, where I made My name dwell at the first, and
see what I did to it because of the wickedness of My people Israel. 13“And now, because you have
done all these things,” declares the LORD, “and I spoke to you, rising up early and speaking, but
you did not hear, and I called you but you did not answer, 14therefore, I will do to the house
which is called by My name, in which you trust, and to the place which I gave you and your
fathers, as I did to Shiloh. 15“I will cast you out of My sight, as I have cast out all your brothers,
all the offspring of Ephraim.”
“Temple” (hekhal ) occurs three times in the “deceptive words” in verse 4. Thereafter, in verses 10,
11 and 14, the building in question is referred to as “house, which is called by my name.” These
two expressions refer to the same building, but each attributes a different status to it.
Crucially, unlike the people who deceived themselves by calling it the temple, the Lord does
not refer to it as such, reinforcing the claim that this building has been made unworthy of being
called the temple because of the conduct of those who entered there to worship. (Verse 12 reflects
the same avoidance of “temple” with respect to Shiloh.)
Now let us consider some modern translations, ones that reflect an SMR theory of translation.
The NIV inserts “temple” in verse 14:
14 Therefore, what I did to Shiloh I will now do to the house that bears my Name,
the temple you trust in, the place I gave to you and your fathers.n
7I am grateful to Christoph Unger for bringing this case to my attention.
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Presumably the translators added “temple” to help the reader understand that “house that bears
my Name” refers to what was erroneously being called the temple. Unfortunately this puts “tem-
ple” into the Lord’s mouth, undercutting the very point He was making, namely, his refusal to
endorse the “place” at Shiloh as the temple.
The CEV and the NLT go further:
1. Both use “temple” in verse 2 instead of “house of the Lord.”
2. Both remove the repetition of “temple” in verse 4, repetition that calls attention to the error
of calling the place “temple.”8
3. Both use “temple” in verses 10, 11 and 14. The NLT goes one step further in using “temple”
twice in verse 14, which reads:
14 So just as I destroyed Shiloh, I will now destroy this Temple that was built to
honor my name, this Temple that you trust for help, this place that I gave to you
and your ancestors.
The NIV, CEV and NLT have the Lord referring to the building as the temple, thus attributing
to it the status of the temple, affirming the very idea that He is rejecting.
Why should the NIV, CEV and NLT translators have made this adjustment? I think there are
two main reasons. First, they placed a high value on producing natural English text (as stated in
the introductions of each translation). The phrase “this house, which is called by my name” is
long and clumsy, whereas “temple” is short and tidy, so the change was undoubtedly motivated by
naturalness and, in the case of the CEV, by “economy of words (see Newman [11, p. 16]).
Second, and perhaps more significantly, the translators understood “temple” and “house that
bears my Name” to be denotationally equivalent, that is, as referring to the same building. In verse
2 the CEV even adds a footnote to “temple” explaining, “The Hebrew text has ‘house of the LORD,’
another name for the temple.” Clearly, their justification for the change is denotational equivalence.
The code model, with its semantics-focused notion of meaning, fostered the feeling that denota-
tively equivalent expressions should be largely interchangeable, with perhaps minor connotational
differences. So the translators may not have considered the broader consequences of replacing the
clumsy by the simple.
2.2 Matthew 11.2–6
Consider the NASB rendering of Mt 11.2–6:9
2Now when John, while imprisoned, heard of the works of Christ [ta erga tou Chris-
tou], he sent word by his disciples 3and said to Him, “Are You the Expected One, or
shall we look for someone else?” 4Jesus answered and said to them, “Go and report
to John what you hear and see: 5the blind receive sight and the lame walk, the lepers
are cleansed and the deaf hear, the dead are raised up, and the poor have the gospel
preached to them. 6“And blessed is he who does not take offense at Me.”
The NIV and CEV render ta erga tou Christou as “what Christ was doing,” the NLT as “all the
things the Messiah was doing,” and The Message [9] as “what Jesus was doing.”10 Each of these
interprets and renders tou Christou as a referring expression denoting Jesus.
8Perhaps the repetition even mocks those who thought they could make this building become
the temple by repeatedly calling it so. If so, this would be another case of rhetorical oversight.
9I have benefited from discussion with Ann Nyland, Iver Larson and Peter Kirk about this pas-
sage.
10The Net Bible mentions that some manuscripts of the Western tradition have “Jesus” at this
point. I am grateful to Iver Larson for pointing this out to me.
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After the fact, in the “mutual cognitive environment” of the evangelist and his readers (includ-
ing us), Christ (or Messiah) is known to be an appropriate expression for denoting Jesus. But did
John know this? No, he suspected it but did not know it. Indeed, it was his uncertainty that moti-
vated him to put the question to Jesus (by means of his disciples).
In light of what John had heard, what he suspected, and the nature of Jesus’ response, I claim
that tou Christou should NOT be interpreted and translated simply as denoting Jesus11 and that
ta erga tou Christou should be interpreted and translated in a way that emphasizes messianic
expectations over directly identifying Jesus. That is, (a) should be favored over (b):
(a) the works of the Christ (whoever He might be)
(b) the works of Christ (who we know to be Jesus)
ta erga tou Christou might be rendered along the lines of “events/activities characteristic of the
Messiah” or perhaps even simply as “messianic activity.”
What is the nature of Jesus’ answer to John? He does not answer the question directly, as he
might have done by saying, “Yes, I am the Messiah.” Rather, he responds with an abductive ar-
gument: he encourages John to ABDUCE that he was the Messiah from relevant evidence. This
depends crucially on the activation of the messianic expectation, a major part of which is an impli-
cation of the form: IF x is the Messiah, THEN x gives sight to the blind AND x makes the lame walk
AND x raises the dead AND. . . . This—I maintain—is activated by ta erga tou Christou in verse 2.
And once activated, ho erchomenos, “the coming one” in verse 3 can be understood as a reference
to the Messiah (which justifies the NASB’s rendering of ho erchomenos as “the Expected One”).
And, I maintain, the force of this argument is undercut if ta erga tou Christou is translated in a
way that fails to activate the messianic expectation, which, I believe, is the case if tou Christou is
translated in a way that can pass as a simple reference to Jesus.
Why have translators translated ta erga tou Christou as ”what Christ/Messiah was doing”?
Here are some speculations:
1. The SMR theories of translation rooted in the code model were largely formulated in terms
of local, equivalence-maintaining “adjustments” that could be made in translating from the
source to the target text.
One class of adjustments for the New Testament deals with Greek genitives. One frequent
case is a genitive phrase modifying a noun that expresses a verbal idea (often a de-verbal
noun), for which the genitive indicates the subject. Such cases can be translated by expressing
the head noun as a verb and the genitive as its subject. Thus “deed [of X]” can be adjusted
to “[X] did/was doing/is doing/will do/. . . Y.” As a relative clause this becomes “what [X]
is/was doing.”
So translators may have translated ta erga tou Christou as “what Christ/Messiah was doing”
simply because it follows a generally accepted and frequently applied adjustment.
2. The translators may have constructed a different understanding of the dynamics of the text,
one that does not place importance on the activation of the messianic expectation or does not
understand ta erga tou Christou as playing a crucial role in its activation.
For example, it might be thought that the messianic expectation is adequately activated by
ho erchomenos ‘the coming one’ (which the NASB renders as “the Expected One”) in verse
11In a discussion of my claim, one discussant suggested that the article tou with Christou favored
interpreting the expression as a direct reference to Jesus, but another discussant countered that
tou Christou could just as well be understood as ‘the anointing,’ activating the concept of messiah
rather than denoting Jesus. I believe that both interpretations are GENERALLY possible, but that
which is appropriate in any SPECIFIC case must be decided on the basis of what makes the text
coherent.
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3. I believe, however, that this phrase succeeds in referring to the Messiah only because the
messianic expectation has already been activated by verse 2.
3. The translators may have judged that ta erga tou Christou should be understood from the
evangelist’s perspective, not from John’s perspective. The evangelist knew that Jesus was the
Christ and could well have assumed that his readers also knew this, and thus could have
been simply referring to Jesus. But did he?
I think not, for this would diminish the text’s impact on the reader. If, at the outset, Jesus were
identified as the Messiah, the reader would not need the argument that Jesus gave John. This
early identification would diminish the extent to which the reader is drawn to identify with
John: his need for confirmation and his construction of the abductive argument that makes
Jesus’ response an affirmation that He is indeed the Messiah.
3 Repetition: John 4.17–19
Simplicity may trump rhetoric.
Cases in which the same meaning is expressed twice are awkward for the code model. If the
meaning is TRANSMITTED once, that should suffice; repetition should be unnecessary. This idea is
inherited by the SMR translation theories: if the meaning is TRANSLATED once, that should suffice;
repetition should be unnecessary.
A case in point is found in Jesus’ interaction with the woman of Samaria reported in John 4. The
NASB rendering is as follows:
16He said to her, “Go, call your husband and come here.” 17The woman answered
and said, “I have no husband.” Jesus said to her, “You have correctly said, ’I have no
husband’; 18for you have had five husbands, and the one whom you now have is not
your husband; this you have said truly.” 19The woman said to Him, “Sir, I perceive
that You are a prophet.
Why is “You have correctly said” (v. 17) followed so quickly by “this you have said truly” (v. 18)?
And how should it be translated?
The NLT rendering simply eliminates the repetition, suggesting that Jesus is straightforwardly
praising the woman’s honesty:
17“I don’t have a husband,” the woman replied. Jesus said, “You’re right! You don’t
have a husband—18for you have had five husbands, and you aren’t even married to the
man you’re living with now.”
The CEV reflects the application of a criterion of “economy of words” [11, p. 16], whereby most
repetition is removed (especially that found in Hebrew poetry). However, in Jn. 4.17–18, the CEV
keeps the repetition, but brings the two statements together into the very natural “That’s right,
you’re telling the truth.”:
17−18The woman answered, “I don’t have a husband.” “That’s right,” Jesus replied,
“you’re telling the truth. You don’t have a husband. You have already been married
five times, and the man you are now living with isn’t your husband.”
As with the NLT, this rendering suggests that Jesus was simply praising the woman’s honesty, with
no hint that his words should NOT be taken at face value.
Contrary to the approach taken by the NLT and the CEV, I believe the repetition had an impor-
tant rhetorical function: It provoked the woman to go beyond a straightfoward understanding of
Jesus’ words as praise for honesty. It invited her to understand that Jesus recognized that, in effect,
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she was using the literal truth to tell a lie. And because the repetition succeeded in doing this, the
woman is lead to perceive that Jesus is a prophet.
The rhetorical effect I posit here for Jesus’ words is consistent with Pilkington’s [15] analysis of
the cognitive effects of repetition. He claims (very approximately) that, because repetition causes
additional work (processing effort), the hearer expects interpretive compensation, and this expec-
tation motivates the hearer to search for deeper effects.12
Conclusion
I claim that modern translations continue to be influenced by the code model and SMR theories of
translation. They err in ways that can be traced back through SMR translation theories to their code
model roots.
I discussed two cases of echoic utterance (Matthew 15.21–28 and 1 Corinthians 11.19) that have
been translated literally with detrimental effect, two cases of referring expressions (Jeremiah 7.1–15
and Matthew 11.2–6) that have been translated in ways that undermine the rhetorical point of the
passage, and a case of rhetorically-motivated repetition (John 4.17–19) translated in ways that leave
no clue to the rhetorical effect.
I have presented evidence; the verdict now rests with you, the reader.
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